Summary:
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The United States will co-host a second Summit for Democracy with countries from various continents on March 29-30.
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Corruption, for example, lies at the heart of African public dissatisfaction with the United States will co-host a second Summit for Democracy with countries from various continents, and it has been used to justify several coups in recent years.
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For these reasons, it is prudent to have low expectations for this second summit on democracy.
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Yet, the emergence of summitry as an instrument of geopolitical relations with the continent, not just by the U.S. but also by the EU, China, Russia, and eventually the U.K., makes the strong incongruence between various development and governance ambitions for the region more and more apparent.
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Nonetheless, without fundamentally addressing some of the incentive structures of political elites to rig elections, undermine oversight institutions, and enable intra-party corruption, it cannot be expected to prevent democratic backsliding or alleviate African citizens’ disappointment with democratic performance.
In December 2021, the administration of President Biden conducted the first Conference for Democracy, culminating in the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal, which included approximately a dozen distinct programmes that the United States government intended to sponsor with $424.4 million. The United States will co-host a second Summit for Democracy with countries from various continents on March 29-30. Zambia has been named the African co-host and will join Costa Rica, the Netherlands, and South Korea. Given the considerable international acclaim for Zambia’s president Hakainde Hichilema, who won the 2021 elections and proceeded swiftly to change the nation’s image, the pick of this southern African nation is hardly surprising. Hichilema recently abolished a severe statute prohibiting defaming the president that was regularly used to arrest opposition leaders and activists following years of democratic regression under his predecessor. In addition, he established a new agency for debt management, with civil society participation, to increase the transparency of foreign borrowing.
The regression of the Democrats remains a problem.
The conference comes at an opportune time for Africa. According to surveys conducted by Afrobarometer in 34 African nations, most citizens choose democracy over alternative forms of government. In addition to Zambia, other recent bright spots include Niger, which last year witnessed the first peaceful transfer of power between democratic governments. Recent analysis from the Varieties of Democracy project reveals that 79 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s population continues to reside in regimes classified as electoral autocracies or closed autocracies. These regimes hold elections for the chief executive but do not adhere to standards for free and fair elections. There is also a temporal dimension to these descriptions: One-third of Africa’s population, according to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, lives in a country where political involvement, rights, and inclusion have worsened severely during the past five years. Several of the region’s former democratic supporters have switched courses. Senegalese President Macky Sall, for example, continues to dodge whether he will run for an unlawful third term in the next elections, despite having opposed his predecessor’s efforts to do more than a decade ago.
Preparations for significant elections in 2023 are unsettling.
Several critical elections in 2023 will also reveal the region’s democratic vulnerabilities. In numerous nations, confidence in the integrity and competency of electoral commissions remains difficult. Nigeria’s recently finished general elections are a case in point; the Independent Nigerian Electoral Commission’s adoption of an electronic voter accreditation system had aroused high hopes regarding voter transparency. But, it violated its electoral legislation by failing to electronically send the results to its IReV portal, creating widespread suspicions of vote fraud. Concerns regarding the independence of the new head of the National Independent Election Commission sparked large-scale demonstrations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in late 2021. (CENI). Inadequate finance for the CENI and continued violence in the country’s east have spurred rumours that this year’s elections may be postponed. The United Nations has decided not to establish a basket fund in Madagascar to pay for the $33 million asked by the electoral commission to undertake elections due for the end of the year. This decision is based on several factors, including a lack of confidence in preparations thus far, uncertainty over how previous resources were utilised, and a failure to implement election observer recommendations from the 2018 elections, during which Russia mounted a substantial disinformation campaign in the country.
Inconsistent electoral constituency boundary delimitations continue to be a barrier to the defence of democracy in the region and threaten the legitimacy of elections. Few anticipate the July 2023 elections in Zimbabwe will be free or fair. Still, civil society and opposition groups are even more dubious in light of the revised electoral boundaries delineated by the Zimbabwe Election Commission and passed into law in late February 2023. The district lines favour districts that have historically supported the governing of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front. Similarly, Sierra Leone’s opposition has criticised the findings of last year’s census, which are used to determine seat boundaries for the elections scheduled for June 2023. The census, from which the World Bank and EU withdrew assistance, appears to have halved the population of Freetown, the capital city and stronghold of the opposition. In contrast, the number of people in defence of the ruling party has increased.
Emerging anti-corruption activities require political support.
Concerns regarding the performance of democracies extend beyond electoral dynamics. Corruption, for example, lies at the heart of African public dissatisfaction with the performance of democracies, and it has been used to justify several coups in recent years. Many anti-corruption initiatives have been started as a result of the inaugural democracy summit, with an emphasis on empowering civil society and the media to uncover misconduct and increase transparency. Although their efforts and those of anti-corruption champions are vital, they are insufficient without incentives destabilising the political order that promotes public waste. For example, the South African Zondo report is regarded as one of the most comprehensive audits of a government’s finances, as it reveals significant favouritism inside the ruling African National Party. Despite the country’s vibrant civil society and solid oversight mechanisms, South Africa was added to the Financial Action Task Force’s “grey list” in late February for financial crimes and money laundering. Similarly, at the inaugural democracy summit, Malawi pledged to assist oversight institutions, explicitly promising to increase the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s independence (ABC). A year later, the director of the ACB was detained and suspended from her position before issuing arrest warrants for many high-ranking officials suspected of involvement in corrupt acts.
What to anticipate from the summit on democracy
For these reasons, it is prudent to have low expectations for this second summit on democracy. Undoubtedly, it will be a significant chance for civil society organisations, media, industry, and specific governments to share strategies for traversing limited political environments and exhibit their achievements. Ideally, there will also be information on whether the promises made at the first summit were fulfilled and how the allocated resources were utilised. Yet, the emergence of summitry as an instrument of geopolitical relations with the continent, not just by the U.S. but also by the EU, China, Russia, and eventually the U.K., makes the strong incongruence between various development and governance ambitions for the region more and more apparent. During the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Conference, for instance, the number of promises vastly exceeded the money given under the Presidential Plan for Renewal, and there was no discussion of democracy. Human rights groups criticised the invitation of some of Africa’s most despotic leaders, including the dictator who has ruled Equatorial Guinea for forty years. This second summit on democracy will retain its symbolic significance. Nonetheless, without fundamentally addressing some of the incentive structures of political elites to rig elections, undermine oversight institutions, and enable intra-party corruption, it cannot be expected to prevent democratic backsliding or alleviate African citizens’ disappointment with democratic performance.