Unsurprisingly, acquaintances, former coworkers, and regular people frequently discussed the elections and the earthquake in the same sentence. Many suggested alternative escape routes and expressed concerns about the upcoming mega-earthquake in Istanbul. I met folks trying to buy property overseas, stocking up on water in their cars, or moving to a new, safer residence.

The nation appeared to be on the verge of a nervous breakdown due to the anxiety over a potentially catastrophic earthquake near Istanbul and the impending elections.

I was also surprised to discover that almost everyone believed Erdogan would lose the upcoming election. There was nearly a naïve confidence that this was Erdoan’s final stand in interviews with journalists, opposition leaders, and even bureaucrats. Only two people I met in Istanbul who were journalists and media executives stated they thought Erdogan would win in the end because they were so overconfident about the likelihood of an opposition triumph.

Of course, there are excellent justifications for assuming that. In the polls, the six-party opposition coalition is in the lead. Younger people desire change, and Erdoan’s authoritarian agreement with Turkish society appears to have fallen apart. The formerly effective patronage system is now openly condemned for nepotism due to double-digit inflation. Because of the government’s poor response to the earthquake, it was made clear that, despite the state’s seeming omnipotence, its institutions were hollowed out, money was scarce, and corruption was rife. Fewer candidates than in past years have applied for parliamentary seats, reflecting that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) can no longer monopolize politics as it did ten years ago.

Nonetheless, there are causes to use caution. There are still six weeks until the elections, and a lot may happen in Turkey during that period. If Erdogan can retain his position of power, I am concerned about this certainty of change and its effects on Turkish society. For many people, that would entail more than just losing an election; it would also likely include feelings of injustice, potential wrath from the public, and pessimism about the nation’s future. Turkey’s political conflict has evolved to reflect a personal and existential conflict for people on both sides.

Of course, a sizeable portion of the population still supports Erdogan as the most outstanding candidate to govern Turkey. (According to a recent Metropoll poll, 51.6% of respondents say they won’t vote for Erdogan, while 43.5% say they would or may.) The AKP’s policies liberalized Turkey during Erdoan’s first ten years in office and helped many citizens escape poverty by enhancing social security and services. Throughout the second half of his two-decade reign, Erdoan deftly manipulated identity politics, nationalism, and cultural conflicts to give Sunni conservatives a say in Turkey’s future. He repositioned Turkey as an unstoppable emerging force by singularly fusing neo-Ottomanism and Islamism. Erdoan is the only person who can “Make Turkey Great Again,” according to the AKP base.

Others, though, blame Erdogan for Turkey’s slide into authoritarianism and its dire economic situation. World order issues are not as important to them as staying alive economically. Many people will consider, “Who can run the country better?” or, more specifically, “Under which administration am I better off?”

The opposition has made the reasonably convincing case that the issue extends beyond Erdoan alone and instead centres on the nation’s consolidated one-person rule, established by a referendum that narrowly passed in 2017. The opposition is known as the “Table of Six,” a rather uncomfortable alliance of six parties ranging from the right to social democrats, which is externally supported by the pro-Kurdish HDP. Its key campaign promise is to overthrow Erdoan’s one-person government and restore the parliamentary system and the rule of law.

The fact that this opposition group has persevered in the face of constant government propaganda and fake news in such an oppressive environment speaks volumes about Turkish society’s desire for change.

Yet the Republican People’s Party’s Kemal Klçdarolu, who is 74 years old, maybe the opposition’s Achilles’ heel (CHP). The social democrat from Turkey’s Alevi/Alawite minority is a soft-spoken ex-civil servant. The discussion surrounding Klçdarolu is comparable to what Democrats in the US are thinking about doing before the 2020 elections. He may be sweet, but can he defeat a dragon? Following a year of drama and infighting, the opposition groups finally decided on Klçdarolu with the idea that the popular mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, Ekrem Ormolu and Mansur Yavaş, who would act as his vice mayors, would boost his ticket.

Klçdarolu is not attempting to emulate Turkey’s erratic leader. If anything, he has established himself as the strongman’s opposite: a regular family man who makes anti-corruption movies from his middle-class kitchen and quietly brings together the various parts of Turkish society.

But, given that this nation introduced the idea of the “deep state” to the global language and has a long history of self-appointed regime guards, his mission will not be simple. In the rural Kurdish areas, voter suppression is a reality, and managing the ballots as they are counted is essential to winning. And why do Turks believe Erdogan “looks comfortable” if his chances are as slim as surveys indicate? Possibly because the Turkish president wields significant state power and has successfully used the legal system to remove several of his main competitors, like the Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtas and “Mamoru.” According to reports, government trolls are aiding a splinter opposition group, a strategy also employed in Russia and Hungary. The new election law in Turkey is also untested. This will make it more difficult for the opposition to keep track of the vote and win a legislative majority.

Even if Erdogan lost, Turkey would still be dealing with its difficulties. Following the elections, the economy will undoubtedly experience problems and may even experience a currency crisis. Suppose Erdogan’s AKP can maintain its parliamentary majority. In that case, the ability of a post-Erdoan government to address inflationary pressures and the economic impact of years of financial foolishness may be severely constrained.

The Turkish president, meantime, has made a rapid turn to the right, forming agreements with small parties that provide little benefits but carry a high ideological cost. This includes the ultra-conservative HÜDA PAR, a descendant of the notorious Turkish Hezbollah that terrorized Kurdish areas in the late 1990s, and the New Welfare Party, whose primary demand was the repeal of the law that protects women from domestic violence. Although this poisoned chalice may occasionally lend a hand to Erdoan, the secularists, Kurds, and Alawites of Turkey view it as an existential threat.

Numerous individuals have questioned my ability to imagine free elections in Turkey and whether Erdogan would ever concede if he lost. That’s correct; it is. Forget it if the slight difference is 1% to 2%. The elections would be contested in the manner of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and American President Donald Trump. Yet, it is irrevocable if the opposition wins by over 2%. Erdogan could not challenge a convincing victory because he based his legitimacy on elections.

Turkey’s worst-case scenario would be a tie, with both sides claiming victory. For the opposition to win on May 14, they will need a strong monitoring organization. The opposition won Istanbul (and other major cities) in the local elections of 2019 due to the opposition’s vigilance; some observers slept on sealed vote boxes to prevent manipulation. That would need to be repeated by the opposition all around the nation, particularly in the conservative heartland and the Kurdish region.

Whoever wins, Turkey will have a difficult time in the coming years. The country was once a shining star on the edge of Europe. Still, my recent trip made me understand that it was broken by earthquakes, economic difficulty, and—most importantly—polarization. There will be an opportunity to restore democracy and perhaps even an efficient economic government if the opposition wins. However, building a national consensus on important topics will be challenging given the recent years’ bare-knuckle politics.

In the best-case scenario, the election can only start a protracted rehabilitation process of Turkey’s political and economic system.

In any case, it would be wise to start.